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Abstract
A conventional theme of the literature on customary land tenure is that multiple ownership
and complex tenure systems are obstacles to agricultural development. By studying the persis-
tence of dual landownership in preindustrial China, I hypothesize that complex property norms
could be the endogenous outcome of collective choice under institutional constraints, thus may
not be inefficient per se. Dual ownership acted as a tax shelter for heavily taxed peasants who
colluded with lightly taxed gentry to maximize the value of land. I show empirically that as gen-
try’s tax privilege declined after the tax reform, peasants started to consolidate landownership.
The dual owner system provided a solution to the land-use inefficiency problem emphasized
by David Ricardo: Under unequal taxation, land would end up owned by those with stronger
political influence and preferential tax rates rather than by those best able to use it.
∗Contact: hyang6@gmu.edu I am grateful to the Economic History Association for their generous Dissertation
Fellowship. I am indebted to the support from my dissertation committee – John Nye, Alex Tabarrok, and Carlos
Ramirez. I would especially like to thank Yoram Barzel for a long discussion of the preliminary ideas of the paper.
David Friedman pointed me to his lecture notes about David Ricardo’s work. I also want to thank Kang Chao, Mark
Koyama, and Tianyang Xi for their suggestions.
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“Rent often belongs to those who, after many years of toil, have realised their gains,
and expended their fortunes in the purchase of land or houses; and it certainly would
be an infringement of that principle which should ever be held sacred, the security of
property, to subject it to unequal taxation.”
– David Ricardo
1 Introduction
Rules of tenure define how property rights to land are to be allocated. The basic economic efficiency
criterion for land-use allocation is land value maximization. In an agrarian society, the value of
agricultural land is determined by two factors, agricultural productivity and land tax. On the one
hand, those with the best farming skills are able to generate the highest output, but may face high
land tax rates. On the other hand, those who have political power often enjoy tax privilege, but
may not have good farming skills. Therefore, how should property rights be efficiently allocated
under the conflicting conditions? This is a problem David Ricardo was concerned with.1
This paper provides a solution to Ricardo’s problem that had been used in China from the late
Ming Dynasty till the Communist land reform. The solution is dual landownership2. Under dual
landownership, land was divided into subsoil (tian di) and topsoil (tian mian). Subsoil properties
and topsoil properties were separately sold or collaterized in the land market. Subsoil properties
tended to be owned by lightly-taxed gentry households who took the responsibility of paying the
land tax3. Topsoil properties tended to be owned by heavily-taxed commoner (peasant) households
who managed day-to-day farming. While subsoil owners held the official land titles, they did not
interfere with agricultural production, but rather collected a ground rent from topsoil owners.
1In On the principle of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo wrote: “And if it be considered, that land,
regarded as a fit subject for exclusive taxation, would not only be reduced in price, to compensate for the risk of that
taxation, but in proportion to the indefinite nature and uncertain value of the risk, would become a fit subject for
speculations, partaking more of the nature of gambling, than of sober trade, it will appear probable, that the hands
into which land would in that case be most apt to fall, would be the hands of those, who possess more of the qualities
of the gambler, than of the qualities of the sober-minded proprietor, who is likely to employ his land to the greatest
advantage.”
2 Some scholars use the concept ”One field Two Masters” System. Some call it secondary landlordism system.
3The concept of gentry refers for a social class called shenshi or shenjin, meaning variously degree-holders, literati,
scholar-bureaucrats or officials.
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Economic historians use the concept of the agricultural ladder to describe the hierarchy of a land
tenure system from wage laborers at the lowest rung, to sharecroppers and tenants on intermediate
rungs, and to sole owners at the top rung (Alston and Ferrie 2008 ). The Chinese dual owner
system stands between fixed-rent tenancy and sole ownership. Although the collection of a fixed
ground rent makes dual ownership appear as an ordinary fixed-rent tenancy, dual ownership differs
from fixed-rent tenancy on several major aspects: First, topsoil owner was not subject to eviction
threat as long as the ground rent was paid. Second, once the ground rent was set between the
topsoil owner and the subsoil owner, it could never be increased. Third, subsoil owners were not
responsible for land improvement.
Interestingly, the Chinese way to solve Ricardo’s problem was an application of the Ricardian
principle of comparative advantage. In the Qing Dynasty, households were divided into gentry
households and commoner(peasant) households. Gentry households enjoyed tax privileges, but
did not have good farming skills. While gentry households had a comparative advantage in tax
reductions, peasant households had a comparative advantage in farm management. To maximize
the value of land, the peasants and the gentry entered into a perpetual lease which assigned the
former the full responsibility of farm management and assigned the latter the full responsibility of
tax payment. The perpetual lease defined the peasants as topsoil owners and the gentry as subsoil
owners.
I hypothesize that dual ownership acted as a tax shelter for heavily taxed peasant households
who colluded with lightly taxed gentry households to maximize the value of land4. To explain the
mechanism of the hypothesis, I construct a simple model and discuss the conditions that give rise
to dual ownership. The separation of topsoil and subsoil arises if the peasant becomes the sole
residual claimant of agricultural production and the gentry becomes the sole residual claimant of
tax payment. The model has an important implication: The dual owner system exhibits separation
of ownership and control. The operation of topsoil is completely independent from the ownership
structure of subsoil. Under the dual ownership system, topsoil owners are responsible for land
4It should be noted that tax shelter was not only sought by commoners, but also by lower-ranked gentry who
enjoyed less tax privileges than higher-ranked gentry. As long as there is a differential tax rate between the two
parties, dual ownership arrangement could be formed.
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improvement and agricultural investment. According to the Fisher Separation Theorem, regardless
of the ownership structure of subsoil, topsoil owners can make optimal investment decisions. Thus,
the dual owner system did not impede agricultural investment.
To test the tax shelter hypothesis, I exploit a dataset constructed from the land transaction
and rent collection archives of Confucius’s Lineage in the Qing Dynasty. I find that as the gentry’s
comparative advantage in tax reductions declined after the tanding rumu tax reform in mid Qing,
peasants tended to consolidate landownership and become sole owners. Moreover, dual ownership
was more likely to arise on double cropped plots than annually cropped plots due to peasants’
greater comparative advantage in managing double cropping systems.
The implication of the hypothesis contributes to an ongoing debate on whether the dual owner
system was one of those complex property norms that caused the relative decline of Chinese agri-
culture in the preindustrial period5. Comparing the Chinese customary property norms with the
Anglo-American private property system, some scholars claim that the Chinese customary tenure
systems were inefficient. Brenner and Isett (2002) claim that in the Yangzi delta absentee landlords
extracted high levels of surpluses from the agricultural sector but had little incentive to invest in
production due to the dual owner system. Macauley (2009) argues that dual ownership provided
security for tenants, but made land transactions and tax collection difficult. Objecting to this line
of argument, Pomeranz (2010) responds that the Chinese property systems seem to have facilitated
transfers of usage rights to those who were positioned to make the best use of the land.
More broadly, this paper is related to the literature on the role of customary tenure system and
indigenous property norms in economic development. A conventional theme of this literature is that
complex customary systems of land tenure, including multiple ownership and lack of official titles,
are obstacles to land transactions and agricultural investment (De Soto 1989, Besley 1995, Yoo
and Steckel 2010). These studies usually take the customary tenure systems as exogenously given.
Following Conning and Robinson (2007), my paper shows that customary property rights can be
5There is a large literature along this line. For instance, some posit that the custom of partitioning on inheritance
resulted in small fragmented holdings that impeded economy of scale. Huang (1985) considers the lack of managerial
farming an important cause of agricultural stagnation based on the fact that most landlords were rental landlords
rather than managerial landlords. Some think that the problem of Chinese property system is the restrictions on
the transaction of land. Some argue that the custom of ”conditional sales” ((dian) that guaranteed the seller an
interminable right of redemption at zero interest was the cause of inefficiency (Zhang 2011, Ellickson 2012).
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the endogenous outcome of collective choices under certain political constraints and institutional
constraints, thus may not be inefficient per se.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the historical background of dual owner-
ship. Section 3 summarize the literature on dual ownership. Section 4 constructs a simple model
to explain the mechanism of dual ownership. Section 5 provides an empirical test of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Dual Owner System
The separation of topsoil and subsoil had been one of the central features of the Chinese land
market from the late 16th century to the early 20th century (Pomeranz 2010, Yang 1988). The
dual owner system spread over China and was especially popular in the advanced areas, including
much of the Yangzi delta. Due to a lack of statistics in the early periods, only limited regional
estimation about the distribution of dual ownership could be obtained. In a study based on the
land registration book (yu lin ce) from the Kang Xi period (1661-1722), Zhang (1988) estimated
that 95% of the lands in Anhui Province had separate subsoil rights and topsoil rights. Dual
landownership persisted in the Republican period and was eventually ended by the Communist
Land Reform. Besides mainland China, dual ownership was also popular in the pre-British New
Territories of Hong Kong and pre-colonial Taiwan. Figure 1 shows the estimated proportion of land
under dual ownership in each province in the 1930’s according to the National Land Survey6.
Figure 1 about here.
An important feature of the dual owner system is a high level of absentee proprietorship. According
to the estimation of a scholar in the 18th century, 40% - 50% of the landlords (subsoil owners) in
the Yangzi delta lived in the cities; 30% - 40% lived in towns, and only 10% - 20% lived in
villages (Bernhardt 1992). The high degree of absentee landlordism generated several problems.
6The figure was likely to have underestimated the proportion of dual ownership, especially in the Southern
provinces. The estimation excluded leases that did not stipulate contract duration. However, in South China,
many perpetual leases didn’t specify contract duration. These contracts were in fact dual ownership contracts.
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First, as topsoil owners lived close to their properties and subsoil owners lived in towns and cities,
the shipment of in-kind rent from rural areas to urban areas involved large transportation costs.
No matter who had to pay the shipment costs, this arrangement seemed to be costly7. Second,
because subsoil owners lived far away from their properties, topsoil owners could take advantage
of information asymmetry and under-report harvest. Their purpose was to obtain ex-post rent
reduction by renegotiating with subsoil owners. Rent renegotiations and rent disputes were costly8.
2.2 Tax Inequality
In the Qing Dynasty, effective land tax rates were determined by two factors, the social status of
the taxpayer and the transaction costs of tax collection. The higher the social status of a taxpayer,
the lower the effective tax rate he faced9. The higher the transaction costs of tax collection, the
higher the effective tax rate.
Different social classes faced different effective land tax rates. Gentry households were closely
connected with official hierarchy and enjoyed preferential effective tax rates10. Land tax was com-
prised of two parts, the grain tax and the di-ding quota (labor services). Gentry households had
lower rates than commoner households in both the grain tax and the di-ding quota11. For in-
stance, in the mid 19th century, commoner households in the Suzhou area paid the grain tax three
to four times higher than the gentry households. In northern Jiangsu, some gentry households
were exempted from grain tax payment, but the commoners paid 6,000-7,000 cash per shi. Ta-
ble 1 demonstrates the inequality of the di-ding quota between gentry households and commoner
households in several counties from different provinces in the 1900’s:
Table 1 about here.
7If the contract stipulated that the topsoil owner was responsible for shipping the rent, why didn’t the topsoil
owner contract with someone living closer to the property? If the subsoil owner was responsible for collecting the
rent from rural areas to the cities, why didn’t he move closer to his own properties and manage the land by himself?
8In extreme cases, rent disputes might develop into rent-resistance movements.
9After 1750, the amount of tax a landowner paid was determined by the product of a fixed land tax quota and
effective tax rate. Amount of land tax = Land tax quota ∗ effective tax rate (Wang 1973).
10The gap between the rates of gentry households and commoner households varied widely among districts.
11Reported land area and land grades can be manipulated, and were often affected by the social status of taxpayers.
It was not uncommon for powerful gentry landowners and large lineages to bribe tax officers to under-report the size
and grade of their lands. The underpaid tax quota due to tax fraud was transferred to smaller landowners and made
the inequity in collection rates even greater.
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Besides the social status of taxpayers, variations in the transaction costs of tax collection also
generated inequality of effective rates between urban areas and rural areas. The backward condi-
tions in transportation made the costs of tax collection differ between urban areas and rural areas.
In the Qing dynasty, local governments were located in urban areas. To enforce tax payment in
the countryside, local governments set up rural tax collection stations to ship the grain tax to the
cities. The additional enforcement costs and shipping costs in the countryside were borne by the
taxpayers living in those areas. Therefore, rural areas had higher tax rates than urban areas.
Table 2 about here.
3 Literature
3.1 Theories about the Origin of Dual Ownership
Chinese historians have proposed various theories to explain the historical origins of dual landown-
ership, ranging from the initial partition of property rights over uncultivated lands, financial stress,
to rent default prevention(Yang 1998).
The first theory emphasizes the initial partition of property rights over uncultivated lands. A
supportive evidence is the prevalence of dual ownership in newly cultivated areas12. The rationale
of the hypothesis is that landownership was initially divided between landowners and tenants in the
process of cultivation. Instead of cultivating the land by themselves, landowners rented out the land
to tenants. Conditional on land improvement, topsoil right was ceded to tenants as compensation
for their labor input and fixed investment13. Two issues arise from this analysis: First, why didn’t
the cultivators claim the land by themselves since there was no regulation that prohibited them
from being landowners14? Second, subsoil owners could not increase rent unless they purchased the
12 See Tao Wu, New Form of Dual Ownership and Land Tenure Relations in Qing Jiangnan, for a discussion on the
increasing distribution of dual ownership after the Taiping Rebellion. Another well cited evidence is the popularity of
dual ownership in the newly cultivated areas of Taiwan. The indigenous Taiwanese landowners claimed the wastelands
and became subsoil owners. The Han immigrants who cultivated the land became topsoil owners
13In many tenancy contracts found in Taiwan, tenants were required to have their own farming tools and draft
cattle to be qualified as cultivators.
14A Taiwanese historian Wu Congmin noticed that “It seems that the only thing the subsoil owners needed was
the land title... It wasn’t difficult to obtain the land title. Why didn’t the topsoil owners apply for the title by
themselves?”
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topsoil right from the topsoil owners. Why didn’t subsoil owners have the incentive to purchase
topsoil right and gain from the increased yields after soil was improved?
The financial stress theory argues that peasants who initially had sole ownership of land sold
subsoil right to gentry under financial stress. As a result, owner-cultivators “deteriorated” into
topsoil owners. Supportive evidence is found in land mortgage contracts: Subsoil right was sold
by peasants who initially had sole ownership of land. However, this theory does not explain why
peasants sold subsoil right but kept topsoil right, not vice versa.
The rent default prevention theory claims that to prevent rent default problems landlords re-
quired tenants to pay security deposit. The security deposit arrangement evolved into the purchase
of topsoil. As the amount of security deposit rose, tenants acquired more control of land. Even-
tually, tenants became topsoil owners when the amount of security deposit equaled the price of
topsoil. This theory, however, cannot explain why tenants didn’t climb further up the tenancy
ladder and became the sole owner of land.
The above three theories discuss the initial assignment of property right by analyzing three
approaches to separate topsoil and subsoil: The first assumes that the gentry and the peasant
divided the ownership of an initially uncultivated parcel. The second assumes that the peasant
initially had sole ownership and ceded the subsoil right to the gentry. The third assumes that the
gentry initially had sole ownership and ceded the topsoil right to the peasant. According to the
Coase Theorem, regardless of the initial assignment of property right, the resource should end up
with the party who can use it most efficiently, if there are no impediments to bargaining. Therefore,
the problem with these theories is that they fail to explain why the separation of topsoil and subsoil
prevailed as an efficient arrangement between the peasant and the gentry.
To put it differently, the problem with these theories is the same with some of the hypotheses in
the literature on British open fields- they do not explain why the institution persisted for hundreds
of years. As McCloskey(1980) points out: “...studying the origin of open fields or of anything else is
antiquarianism unless it is accompanied by evidence connecting the origin with persistence.” Thus,
what needs to be explained is the persistence of dual landownership despite the transaction cost
of rent collection, i.e. the cost of shipping grain rent from rural areas to cities and the cost of rent
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disputes.
3.2 The Credit Constraint Theory
Before elaborating on the tax shelter hypothesis, there is still one more alternative hypothesis
that needs to be addressed- the credit constraint hypothesis. Topsoil owners did not climb up
the agricultural ladder to acquire sole ownership because of the credit constraint. The rationale
is that subsoil owners can be viewed as investors who provided finance to agricultural production.
Gentry households had a comparative advantage in accessing the credit market as opposed to
peasant households. Therefore, gentry households became investors (subsoil owners) and peasant
households became farm managers (topsoil owners). The hypothesis seems plausible, as it is well
known that credits in preindustrial China were prohibitively expensive15. Rather than the previous
hypotheses that emphasize the origin of dual ownership, this one deals with the persistence issue.
However, several problems with this hypothesis should be pointed out.
First, why did dual landownership emerge in late Imperial China rather than earlier times?
And why was dual landownership more popular in advanced areas rather than backward areas?
Presumably credits were more expensive in earlier times and in more backward areas. Secondly, it
is not always true that subsoil owners were wealthier and had better access to credit market than
topsoil owners. In fact, it was a common practice that wealthy merchants who had lower political
status and faced relatively high land tax rates, sold or “donated“ large quantities of their land to
privileged gentry families for tax evasion purpose. These merchant landowners had no problem
in accessing credit market. Rather, they chose to remain topsoil owners to avoid the tax burden.
Finally, the mortgage loan market of topsoil and subsoil functioned well in advanced areas. All
sorts of mortgage loan contracts in land financing have been found in recent years. These evidence
weakens the credit constraint hypothesis.
15Credit costs were on the order of 10% per month or 100% per year-in effect ten to twenty times higher than in
Europe (Rosenthal and Wong 2011).
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4 Theory
4.1 The Tax Shelter Hypothesis
I hypothesize that dual landownership persisted because it acted as a tax shelter for heavily taxed
peasant households who colluded with lightly taxed gentry households to maximize the value of
land16. The rationale of the hypothesis follows Barzel (1997) on divided ownership: The value of
agricultural land is determined by agricultural productivity and land tax payment. While peasant
households had a comparative advantage in agricultural production, gentry households had a com-
parative advantage in tax reductions. To maximize the value of land, the peasants and the gentry
entered into a perpetual lease which assigned the former the full responsibility of farm management
and assigned the latter the full responsibility of tax payment. Because of the non-traded farming
skills17 of the peasant and the non-traded social status of the gentry18, the dual owner system best
utilizes the peasant’s comparative advantage in farm management and the gentry’s comparative
advantage in tax reductions. Thus the dual owner system enabled the peasant class and the gentry
class to jointly maximize the land value under unequal taxation. The hypothesis explains not only
why subsoil owners tended to be gentry households, but also why subsoil owners tended to be urban
dwellers. As section 2.2 points out, there were tax rate differentials between cities and villages due
to the transaction costs of tax collection in the countryside.
The dual owner system has a substitute institutional arrangement that also took advantage of
tax rate differentials- tax brokerage (bao lan). Tax brokerage was an underground arrangement
between a gentry broker and commoner taxpayers. On the one hand, the gentry broker paid land
taxes on behalf of the commoners or other less privileged proprietors in exchange for a brokerage
fee. On the other hand, the gentry broker bargained with local government officials to obtain a
lower tax rate. This practice, executed at the expense of the tax revenues of local governments,
16To form a tax shelter by establishing a coalition between a heavily taxed party and a lightly taxed party has a
long history in China. According to Song Hui Yao Ji Gao, in the Tang Dynasty, heavily taxed landowners colluded
with the lightly taxed noble families by entering a rental contract, to avoid the tax burden. This suggests that dual
ownership may have even existed in the Song Dynasty.
17Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) emphasize that the selection of tenancy of contract depends on market imperfections,
such as non-traded farming skills.
18Some may argue that purchase of offices provided a channel for commoners to become gentry. But it should be
noted that the costs of purchasing offices were often beyond the means of a peasant.
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was largely illegal (Bernhardt 1992). Banned by the government, the arrangement of tax brokerage
involved higher risk than the dual owner system19. Due to the risk of transaction, the duration of
a tax brokerage contract should be shorter than that of a dual ownership contract. This is true
because dual ownership is in fact a perpetual lease.
The dual owner system is analogous to today’s corporate tax shelter in a number of ways: First,
just as a corporate tax shelter lacks any significant economic substance in production, a subsoil
owner performed no substantial role in day-to-day farm management. Second, just as a corporate
tax shelter is designed to be replicated multiple times for use by different participants, a subsoil
owner contracted with multiple topsoil owners for tax shelter practices. Third, just as a corporate
tax shelter relies on the use of tax-exempted parties to deflect tax liability from the taxable party,
dual ownership relied on the tax privilege of gentry to deflect tax liability from commoners.
4.2 A Model
This section presents a simple model to describe the mechanism of the tax shelter20. Consider
a mutual agreement over the operation of a parcel between a peasant and a gentry who seek to
jointly maximize the value of the parcel. We assume that the value of the parcel is determined by
agricultural productivity and land tax. The gentry and the peasant both supply effort to manage
the parcel and to lower the tax payment. The set-up of the model largely follows the double-
sided moral hazard model in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), but adds tax payment as an
additional dimension.
Agricultural output is given by F (e, l). The first argument is the managerial input (effort) of
the peasant, while the second argument is the managerial input (effort) of the gentry. Regular
Inada conditions hold that F (0, l) = F (e, 0) = 0, F ′e > 0, F ′l > 0, F
′′
e < 0 and F
′′
l < 0. The effective
tax burden is measured by T0 − T (r, τ), where T0 is a default lump sum tax, and r is the effort of
19Even though the government knew that dual ownership also generated losses of tax revenue, dual ownership
was legal most of the time. The tolerance towards dual ownership was probably due to the difficulty to distinguish
perpetual lease from ordinary fixed-rent tenancy.
20The reason for using a static model rather than a dynamic model is to focus on the mechanism of tax inequality.
A dynamic model would place a lot of emphasis on eviction threat and renewal of contract, which is not the focus
of this paper. Since this is not a dynamic model, we cannot distinguish permanent tenancy from ordinary fixed-rent
tenancy.
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peasant in reducing tax, and τ is the effort of gentry in reducing tax. We could think about the
effort as under-report of land area and grade, petition to local governments for tax reduction, or
participation in a protest against tax burden. Similarly, we assume T ′r > 0, T ′τ > 0, and T ′′r < 0,
T ′′τ < 021.
The gentry and the peasant agree on a rent distribution scheme {R,α}, where R ≥ 0 is a fixed
amount paid by the peasant to the gentry, and α is the share of rent allocated to the gentry. They
share the tax burden by distribution scheme β. The peasant will pay a tax equal to T0 − βT (r, τ).
For managerial input e and r, the peasant suffers a disutility c(e) and s(r). c′(e) > 0, s′(r) > 0
and c′′(e) > 0, s′′(r) > 0. Analogously, the gentry suffers from disutility C(l) and S(τ) for
managerial efforts he puts in. For simplicity, we assume all inputs can be infinitely supplied.
We can write the gentry’s problem as:
maxl,τ,α,β R− T0 + αF (e, l) + βT (r, τ)− C(l)− S(τ)
s.t. (1− α)F (e, l)−R+ (1− β)T (r, τ)− c(e)− s(r) ≥ u0,
(1− α)F ′e − c′(e) = 0
(1− β)T ′r − s′(r) = 0
Without loss of generality, we assign the initial land title to the gentry. The gentry’s problem
in the above program involves his or her input {l, τ} and a distribution scheme {α, β}. The gentry
maximizes his or her share of from the land yielding net of the tax quota he or she is responsible for.
The equation (1−α)F (e, l)−R+(1−β)T (r, τ)−c(e)−s(r) ≥ u0 describes the participation constrain
of the peasant (IR). The other two equations with respect to e and r characterize the peasant’s best
response to the distribution scheme {α, β} (IC). Following Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995),
we obtain the following optimal distribution scheme:
α∗ = (F
′
l )
2[(1−α∗)F ′′ee−c′′(e)]
(F ′e)2[α∗F ′′ll−C′′(l)]+(F ′L)2[(1−α∗)F ′′ee−c′′(e)] ;
β∗ = (T
′
τ )
2[(1−β∗)T ′′rr−s′′(r)]
(T ′e)2[β∗T ′′ττ−S′′(τ)]+(T ′τ )2[(1−β∗)T ′′rr−s′′(r)] .
To establish the result straightforwardly, we assume that both agricultural production and tax
reduction follow the Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e. F (e, l) = eθl1−θ (0 < θ < 1), and T (r, τ) =
21We do not impose any constraint on the value T (∞,∞). When the inputs are large, T0−T (r, τ) can be negative.
In this case, government subsidize a region hit by famine.
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rστ1−σ (0 < σ < 1). Here θ is the output elasticity of the peasant and 1−θ is the output elasticity of
the gentry. Similarly, σ is the tax reduction elasticity of the peasant, and 1−σ is the tax reduction
elasticity of the gentry. Moreover, the disutility functions are convex, c(e) = m1e
2
2 , C(l) =
m2l2
2 ,
s(r) = n1r
2
2 , and S(τ) =
n2τ2
2 . Thenthe share allocated to the gentry in equilibrium is:
α∗ =
1
1 +
√
θ(1+θ)
(1−θ)(2−θ)
(1)
β∗ =
1
1 +
√
σ(1+σ)
(1−σ)(2−σ)
(2)
1. When α→ 0 and β → 1, land would be completely divided into topsoil and subsoil. That is,
the peasant becomes the sole residual claimant of agricultural production and the gentry becomes
the sole residual claimant of tax payment. This occurs when θ → 1 and σ → 1: the peasant has a
comparative advantage in increasing productivity and the gentry has a comparative advantage in
reducing tax burden. 2. When α → 1 and β → 1, the gentry owns the right to both topsoil and
subsoil. This happens when the gentry has a significant advantage in both farm management and
tax exemption: θ → 0 and σ → 1. 3. When α→ 0 and β → 0, the peasant has sole ownership of the
parcel. This happens when the peasant has significant comparative advantage in farm management
and tax exemption. 4. Finally, when 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1, the optimal scheme features the
traditional sharecropping: each of the two parties obtain a share of the agricultural output and
pays a share of the tax22.
Now I turn to the comparative static. I analyze the impact of the following on the ownership
structure: (a) the effect of variations in the relative elasticity of the peasant’s managerial effort. (b)
the effect of variations in the relative elasticity of the peasant’s tax reduction effort. I then move
on to discuss an important implication of the model- the separation of ownership and control.
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus, landownership should be increasingly divided into topsoil and
subsoil as the relative elasticity of peasant’s managerial effort increases.
22The case that α → 1 and β → 0 is unlikely, as it would imply that the gentry specializes in cultivation and the
peasant specializes in paying the tax.
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This is a straightforward implication of equations (1) and (2): As α converges to 0 and β con-
verges to 1, the ownership of land would be increasingly divided into topsoil and subsoil. This
happens when the relative elasticity of the peasant’s managerial effort θ is close to 1. The impli-
cation is that the ownership of land is more likely to be divided, if the peasant’s managerial effort
has a greater impact on the value of the land.
This prediction is supported by two facts. The first is that dual ownership was more often
observed on paddy fields than cotton fields, because the irrigation and daily maintenance of paddy
fields required the peasant to supply more intensive managerial effort (Bernhardt 1992). The second
fact is that landownership was more likely to be divided under multiple cropping system, because
multiple cropping systems required greater managerial effort than annual cropping systems. Section
5 provides a test about this.
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, landownership should be increasingly divided into topsoil and
subsoil as the relative elasticity of peasant’s tax reduction effort decreases.
Similarly, when the tax reduction elasticity of the gentry (1−σ) is close to 1, the peasant would
put little effort in dealing with the land tax. The peasant and the gentry then specialize in the
business they each have comparative advantage in.
This prediction is supported by the evidence that dual ownership was observed on “polder
land” (cao tian) but not on “sandy land” (sha tian) in the regions adjacent to rivers or lakes23.
Polder land, enclosed by a high and thick hard-packed mud wall, was fully cultivated and subject
to taxation. Sandy land was newly claimed land on emerging floodplain that was not yet subject
to taxation. Compared with polders, the relative importance of peasants’ tax evasion effort in
operating sandy land is greater, because peasants could more easily hide information about the size
of sandy lands due to the uncertainty of floods. Therefore, dual landownership was more likely to
be found on polder land.
Proposition 3. The division of subsoil and topsoil exhibits separation of ownership and control.
23A land survey in the county of Changshu, Suzhou and Wuxi found that dual ownership widely existed on polder
lands but not on sandy fields (He 1977, Page 33042).
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When the division of labor occurred as described above, subsoil owners did not interfere with
agricultural production even though they held the official land titles. It was the topsoil owners
who operated production and made investment. Dual ownership exhibits separation of ownership
and control. According to the Fisher Separation Theorem, topsoil owners should be able to make
investment decisions that maximize the present value of agricultural production, independent of
subsoil owners’ preferences. This implication is supported by two facts, subdivision of subsoil and
consolidation of topsoil.
Subsoil properties were often subdivided and jointly owned by multiple subsoil owners. Bern-
hardt (1992) finds that a subsoil owner’s “subsoil portfolio” consisted of many “shares” of subsoil
properties dispersed over a broad area24. The dilution of subsoil ownership could increase rent
collection cost and generate collective action problems among subsoil owners. However, the benefit
of joint ownership is to align the interests of subsoil owners in dealing with rent disputes, a problem
getting increasingly rampant in late Qing Dynasty. To deal with rent-resistance problems, the allied
subsoil owners jointly hired bailiffs or later organized “rent bursaries” to collect rent.
Despite the complex subsoil ownership structure, topsoil owners had incentives to consolidate
adjacent topsoil properties to achieve economy of scale. Evidence is found in topsoil contracts:
In the Ming and the Qing Dynasties, all parcels were assigned with unique registration numbers
by the local tax offices. Adjacent parcels had consecutive registration numbers. Based on the
registration numbers specified in the topsoil contracts, I find that adjacent topsoil properties were
often purchased together. In support of my finding, Chao (2006) notices that in Jiangsu Province,
peasants purchased fragmented topsoil properties from different absentee landowners to consolidate
the topsoil properties25. For instance, 10 topsoil owners in Changzhou County were managing
topsoil properties leased by 48 absentee landowners in the year of 1676.
Sometimes topsoil owners sublet their properties instead of cultivating the land by themselves.
This type of topsoil owner was called secondary landlord. Secondary landlords charged a fixed
24For instance, a family surnamed Qu owned land scattered over 60 percent of Pinghu Country. And between
1772 and 1886, a landlord family of Yuanhe County purchased 490 small separate plots (totally 990) located in forty
different polders. (Page 17).
25Note that the name of the topsoil contract is pi tian yue, which means whole sale land contract. The name could
mean that several top soil properties were being sold together.
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topsoil rent from the subtenants. They were managers of farms who looked for subtenants, inter-
vened with agricultural production, evicted shirking cultivators and made agricultural investments.
Consequently, secondary landlords lived close to their properties to supervise production. The sub-
lease between secondary landlords and subtenants usually had short durations.26 In this scenario,
the Fisher Separation Theorem still holds, since secondary landlords’ management decisions were
independent of subsoil owners’ preferences. Which social classes were likely to become secondary
landlords? Wealthier commoner households who had better access to credit market than poor peas-
ant households but faced higher tax rates than gentry households were likely to become secondary
landlords. The presence of secondary landlords suggests that the operation of farm was further
divided into agricultural production, finance of capital and tax payment. If wealthier commoners’
comparative advantage in providing finances was not large enough, there would not have been a
separate class of secondary landlords arising from topsoil owners.
5 An Empirical Test: Dual Landownership on Confucius’s Manors
This section uses data constructed from the archives of Confucius’s Lineage in Shandong to test
the first two propositions of the model: 1) As the gentry’s comparative advantage in tax reductions
declined after the tax reform in mid Qing, commoners started to consolidate ownership and became
sole owners. 2) Dual ownership was more likely to arise on double cropped plots than annually
cropped plots due to peasants’ greater comparative advantage in managing double cropping systems.
Confucius’s Lineage was one of the most prestigious feudal landlord in Chinese history. In the
Qing Dynasty, the lineage possessed the largest private rural estate (min tian) in China27. They
were also controlling large amount of public land (guan tian)28. There were two types of manors
operated by the lineage, private manors and public manors. Private manors were taxed at rate
lower than the prevalent rate faced by commoners29. Public manors were tax-exempted.
26see Tan (1993), Sandy Land in the Pearl delta of the Qing Dynasty.
27Their properties were located in four provinces (Shandong, Henan, Zhili and Jiangsu).
28In 1705, there were 5,014 tenants working on the public land in the city of Qufu. In 1760, the number of
tenants increased to 10,243.The Shandong Provincial Government, official Info base of Shandong Province. See
http://www.infobase.gov.cn/bin/mse.exe?seachword=&K=a&A=71&run=12 (accessed on 05/15/2012)
29The land tax rates faced by commoners in Shandong Province during the late 19th century were as follows: In
Heze County, the di-ding tax was 0.026 tale per mu and rice 0.38 sheng per mu. In Donghe County, 0.029 tale per
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Both sole ownership and dual ownership existed on private manors and public manors. Dual
ownership takes the form of perpetual fixed-rent tenancy contract. Three features help us identify a
dual ownership contract. 1)The tenants paid a large sum of “security deposit” that was equivalent
to the price of topsoil. 2)The tenants paid a ground rent that was said to be fixed for “a thousand
years”; 3) The tenants could sublet and transfer their holdings without the permission of the lineage;
4) The tenants could decide cropping systems and crop mix. The lineage’s sole ownership takes the
form of share tenancy. Under share contract, the lineage provided seeds, draft animals and farming
tools. The lineage aided with production and took half of the output at harvest. If the tenants
shirk, the lineage can evict the tenant. The tenants could not transfer their holdings without the
lineage’s permission. Thus, sharecropping characterizes the lineage’s sole ownership of land.
5.1 The Impact of Tax Reforms on Dual Ownership
The tanding rumu tax reform in the middle of the Qing Dynasty significantly reduced the tax rate
differential between the gentry and the commoners. The tax reform abolished informal taxes and
surcharges, lowered peasants’ tax burden and reduced tax evasions of wealthy gentry households30.
The reform was initiated by the Yongzheng Emperor in 1723 , but did not finish until 1883 in
some regions, due to local resistance. In the districts of Confucius’s Manors, the tanding rumu
tax reform was launched in 1742 under the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1711-1799). The reform
lowered the tax burden of commoners and reduced the tax privilege of Confucius’s decedents. The
low tax rates lasted through the end of Qianlong Period.
The model predicts that as the gentry’s comparative advantage in tax reduction fell after the tax
reform, the topsoil owners had an incentive to consolidate ownership and become the sole owners
of land. That is because, if the land tax collected by the state fell below the ground rent collected
by the lineage, the topsoil owners would have an incentive to terminate the perpetual lease with
the lineage and switch to pay land tax to the state.
mu and 0.71 sheng per mu. In Yutai, 0.024 tale per mu, and rice 0.13 shen per mu. The private manors had a lower
di-ding tax. The manors enjoyed a tax reduction at 9 li per mu. See Lai Huimin, Imperial Power and Nobilities in
the Qing Dynasty, page, 125)
30This paper does not investigate the details of the tanding rumu tax reform. For a description of
the reform, see Kent Deng, Fact or Fiction? Re-examination of Chinese Premodern Population Statistics
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22353/1/wp76.pdf
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Just as the model predicts, Confucius’s Lineage started to dispose of the subsoil properties to
less privileged households immediately after the tax reform. The disposal of subsoil properties
lasted through the end of the Qianlong period due to the persisting low tax policy. Since private
manors were subject to taxation and public manors were tax-exempted, the lineage’s comparative
advantage in tax reduction of private land declined faster than of public land. Subsoil properties
from private manors should be sold. Table 3 lists the information on subsoil transactions recorded
in the archives of land transactions of the lineage.
Table 3 about here.
Under the reign of Emperor Jiaqing (1796-1820), a series of tax evasion and appropriation
scandals in Shandong Province were disclosed in 1806-180931. Corruption and budget deficit in
Shandong was so serious that the emperor investigated into the tax collection systems of Shandong
and required the local governments to balance the budget. Consequently, the local governments
reassessed tax base and increased land taxes across the province. Large quantities of unregistered
land were discovered and incorporated in the tax base. The reform reduced peasants’ comparative
advantage in tax evasion by increasing the monitoring intensity of tax collection.
As the model predicts, landownership should be increasingly divided into topsoil and subsoil as
the peasants’ comparative advantage in tax evasion decreases. The land transaction documents in
Confucius’s Lineage recorded such a trend: Immediately following the tax reform, commoners and
lower-ranked gentry landowners ”donated” the previously unregistered land to Confucius’s Lineage
to avoid the increasing tax burden in exchange for the tax shelter benefits.32Some of the land
documents specified that the increasing tax burden was the reason for donating land. This practice
divided ownership into topsoil and subsoil and let the lineage become the subsoil owner.
Table 4 about here.
31See Zhu (2001), Studies on Budget Deficit in the Jiaqing Period.
32Presumably some of the lower-ranked gentry landowners were secondary landlords who had better access to credit
market than poorer peasants.
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5.2 The Impact of Double Cropping on Dual Ownership
Wheat-soybean double cropping began to spread in northern China during the late Ming through
the early Qing period33. Wheat-soybean double cropping refers to planting soybeans directly into
wheat stubble after harvesting winter wheat. Double cropping requires intensive input of labor 34.
According to the Handbook of Agriculture and Mulberry (Nong Sang Jing) written in 1705, tenants
on double cropped fields need to work almost 10 months annually.
The technical know-how and managerial skills associated with wheat-soybean double cropping
were more complex than annual cropping. Successful operation of the double cropping system
requires peasants’ timely decisions and careful day-to-day farm management. Tenants’ proper
selection of winter wheat varieties was the first step. An ideal wheat variety in a double cropping
system matures early enough to permit timely establishment of soybeans, and consistently produces
high yields of high-quality grain. Second, every effort must be made to get the wheat harvest and
the soybeans seeded as early as possible. Soybean planting date is crucial in determining the
productivity of the system. Third, the straw remaining after wheat harvest needs to be rearranged.
While excessive amounts of straw can interfere with the soybean planting, some wheat stubble
should be left to provide mulch cover for the soybean crop. Fourth, the proper selection of soybean
varieties is crucial too. Early-maturing varieties do not yield as well as later-maturing varieties,
but late-maturing varieties might not avoid the first killing freeze.
Since the relative elasticity of peasants’ managerial effort was higher under double cropping,
double cropped land should be more likely to be divided into topsoil and subsoil than annually
cropped land.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To test the predictions, I construct a plot-level dataset from the rent collection records of eleven
public manors operated by Confucius’s Lineage. Rent collection records contain information on
33See Li Lingfu (1995) for a discussion about the history of the invention of wheat-soybean double cropping.
34Chao (1986) points out that “the Chinese methods of fertilization and multi-cropping are so labor consuming
that they yield a considerably lower average output per man-hour than other, simpler methods of fertilization and
annual cropping.”
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ownership of the plot, size of plot, type of grain, amount of ground rent, etc35. The dataset are
independently pooled cross sections36.
Table 5 about here.
The statistics of cropping systems on Confucius’s manors are summarized in Table 6. Except
the last one, the other columns are all annual cropping systems. Table 7 summarizes the main
variables.
Table 6 about here.
Table 7 about here.
5.4 The Choice of Dual Ownership
In this section, I outline a probit model to estimate the effects of cropping systems on landownership.
The problem is described by the latent variable model:
Dualownership∗i = X
′
1iβ0 +Doublecroppingiβ1 + TaxReductioniβ2 + i (3)
Dualownership∗i is the propensity of dividing ownership into topsoil and subsoil. Doublecropping
is a dummy variable indicating the choice of double cropping system. TaxReduction is a dummy
variable indicating the period of low land tax under the reign of Emperor Qianlong. X ′1i is a vector
of control variables, including size of a plot, natural disasters37, and kinship variable Kong. i is
a normally distributed random error with zero mean and unit variance. Results from the probit
model are presented in Table 8:
Table 8 about here.
35Since the landlords only maintained the records they were concerned about, the information on tenants was
limited. I do not observe the wealth, labor input, and other household characteristics of tenants. Thus, I do not
know if the topsoil owner was a secondary landlord or a topsoil cultivator.
36I am not able to track the plots over time, since rent collection records were based on units of tenants rather
than plots. Therefore, time-series data is not available.
37I lag shock by one period since shocks in t− 1 would affect contractual choice in t.
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The regression results show that tax reduction has a significantly negative effect and double
cropping has a significantly positive effect on the probability of having dual ownership on a plot. The
tax reduction effect means that under the Qianlong Reign, when land tax burden of commoners was
low, landownership was less likely to be divided. The double cropping effect means that when land
was operated under double cropping systems, landownership was more likely to be divided. This
is consistent with the prediction that as peasants’ comparative advantage in tax reductions/farm
management increases/decreases, landownership tend to be more consolidated/divided. The vari-
able size has a significantly negative effect on the probability of having dual ownership, probably
because smaller plots were more likely to be divided into topsoil and subsoil due to tenants’ credit
constraints. Kinship relation and natural disasters don’t have significant effect on landownership.
5.5 Omitted Variable Bias
In this section I consider the possibility that the adoption of wheat-soybean double cropping is
endogenous to land ownership due to omitted variable bias. Tenant’s idiosyncratic managerial
ability is not directly observable. 38. The sample doesn’t provide good proxy on tenant’s managerial
ability. On the one hand, managerial ability could affect the decision to double crop the land. On
the other hand, managerial ability could also have impact on ownership. A tenant with better
managerial ability may need less managerial directions and aids from landlords, thus more likely
to become independent topsoil owner.
In this section, I outline a bivariate probit model that allows for the possibility of endogeneity.
Suppose the tenant decides to double crop by comparing costs and benefits using a net benefit
function or latent index that is linear in covariates and excluded instruments, with a random
38Another potential source of missing variable bias is the unavailability of proxy for soil quality. I do have infor-
mation on the quality of lands under perpetual fixed-rent contract, but I don’t observe the quality of lands under
share tenancy contract. The amount of ground rent was based on the quality of soil. There were three types of
soils: top-quality soil, medium-quality soil and low-quality soil. It seems natural to assume that high-quality soils
were more suitable for double cropping. But I find that many low-quality plots adopted double cropping as well.
Therefore, I think that the missing variable on soil quality under share tenancy would not generate serious bias in
the results.
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component or error term, µi. The determination of Doublecropping can be specified as:
Doublecropping∗i = X
′
2iγ0 + Ziγ1 + µi (4)
Zi is an instrumental variable that increases the benefits of adopting wheat-soybean double
cropping system. The tenant will double crop the plot if the net benefits of double cropping are
positive: Doublecrop∗i > 0. Following the latent variable model in equation (3), an outcome of
our primary interest is the choice of ownership. The model is identified by assuming that Zi
is independent of these components, and that the random components are normally distributed.
Hence, E[µi] = E[i] = 0, var[µi] = var[i] = 1and cov[µi, i] = ρ. The exogeneity condition is
stated in terms of the correlation coefficient ρ. The null hypothesis is ρ = 0. If we fail to reject the
null hypothesis, then we can conclude that the dummy variable Doublecropping is exogenous and
the probit model (3) is the appropriate specification.
This bivariate probit system is identified if the instrument Zi is correctly chosen. I choose the
price of wheat as the instrumental variable39. If the price of wheat is a valid instrument, then
(1) it must be a determinant of the cropping system, but (2) it must not be a determinant of
ownership, i.e., it must not be correlated with the error term i. It is straightforward to show
that it meets the first criterion. If the price of wheat goes up, tenants would have an incentive to
increase wheat-soybean double cropping. In a simple probit model that explains the probability of
adopting wheat-soybean double cropping technology, the t-statistic on Wheat Price is 3.44. Thus
the credibility of our bivariate probit results turns on our assumption that the price of wheat did
not directly impact divided ownership. Wheat price might impact the value of land. But it seems
unclear how the increase in the value of land would affect landownership.
Table 9 summarizes the estimation results using wheat price as the instrumental variable. Ro-
bust standard errors are clustered at the tenant level. The probit estimates from Table 8 are
replicated for comparison.
Table 9 about here.
39I do not choose soybean price as the instrument, because soybean was much cheaper than wheat. Soybean was
an ideal complementary crop for wheat, because soybean, like most legumes, perform nitrogen fixation that can raise
the fertility of land.
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The likelihood ratio test suggests that the Null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level of
significance. This implies that double cropping is correlated with i and therefore endogenous. The
bivariate probit regression shows that double cropping has a statistically positive effect on choosing
dual ownership after accounting for the endogenous choice of cropping system. The effects of tax
reduction and other controls remain similar.
5.6 Robustness Check
In this section, I perform a robustness check. I compute results from a more restricted sample: Since
paddy fields were more likely to be divided into topsoil and subsoil (see Proposition 1), I am not
fully sure if including paddy fields would bias the estimation of the effect of wheat-soybean double
cropping. Thus, I exclude paddy fields from the sample. Table 10 summarizes the estimation results
from the restricted sample. Again, the probit estimates from Table 8 are replicated for comparison.
Table 10 shows that after excluding paddy fields from the sample, the estimation results remain
similar.
Table 10 about here.
6 Conclusion
A conventional theme of the literature on customary land tenure is that multiple ownership and
complex tenure systems are obstacles to agricultural development. By studying the persistence of
dual landownership in preindustrial China, I hypothesize that complex property norms could be the
endogenous outcome of collective choice under institutional constraints, thus may not be inefficient.
Dual ownership acted as a tax shelter for heavily taxed peasants who colluded with lightly taxed
gentry to maximize the value of land.
This study has an implication about landholding patterns in Chinese history. Historians have
painted two conflicting pictures about landholding patterns in the Ming and the Qing Dynasty. One
school of historians claim that in the most advanced areas of China, land was largely concentrated
in the hands of the rich and powerful40. The majority of peasants were landless and impoverished
40The often cited Confucian scholar Gu Yanwu (1613-1682) described land concentration in the area near Suzhou
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by rent extraction. The other school of historians reverse this statement. They argue that the
majority of independent peasant households owned small fragmented parcels. My study reconciles
the conflicting views by showing that subsoil properties were largely possessed by gentry families;
small topsoil properties were held by the majority of peasants. These two ownership patterns
should not be mixed together.
The second implication of the theory challenges the conventional view that China had few
managerial landlords in the Ming and the Qing Dynasties. Some scholars consider the lack of
managerial farming an important cause of ”agricultural stagnation”. Their evidence is that most
landlords in the advanced areas were rental landlords who extracted surpluses from the agricul-
tural sector but had little incentive to invest in production. This paper shows that secondary
landlords (topsoil owners) were in fact managerial landlords. The concept of managerial landlord
should include not only landlords who hired wage labor on the farm, but also secondary landlords
who sublet their topsoil properties. These secondary landlords provided finance to production,
supplied farming tools, supervised subtenants, and made agricultural investment. Some of them
consolidated large quantities of topsoil properties to grow cash crops. Some of them rented vast
uncultivated areas, divided the properties into small parcels and sublet the parcels to individual
peasants. Therefore, secondary landlords played an important role in expanding production and
adopting new technologies.
The third implication is that subsoil owners were in fact tax farmers. Tax farming is the
principle of assigning the responsibility for tax revenue collection to private citizens or groups.
Subsoil owners owed a fixed land tax quota to the state and paid tax out of the rent revenue they
collected from peasants. The tax rate differentials enabled subsoil owners to earn commissions from
the tax farming practice. However, the risk of rent default was also borne by the tax farmers. The
risk of tax farming increased as rent-resistance movements became more rampant in the mid-late
Qing Dynasty.
Last but not least, the tax shelter hypothesis also sheds light to current property right issues in
in the seventeenth century: “Only one out of ten people is a landowner. The other nine people are tenants.” In 1704
Emperor Kangxi (1661-1772) made a similar estimation on landownership in his country: “Lands are owned by the
rich and powerful... Only thirty or forty percent of people own land. The rest of them are renters.”
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China. Nowadays some firms in the private sector are called “red hat enterprises”. The term “red
hat” means that the firm can obtain a collective or state license for production and operations by
paying administrative fees to the collective unit of local government organization (especially TVEs).
After paying these fees, private owners are able to evade government prohibitions, surcharges and
ideological harassment on their firms. The operational efficiency of these red hat firms is often
higher than their counterpart in the public sector. Just as the peasants who colluded with the
gentry to obtain a tax shelter, these red hat firms collude with the TVEs to obtain a shelter to
evade surcharges and fees.
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Figure 1: The ratio of plots under dual ownership in the 1930s, by province
Source: National Land Survey Report by the land committee,
1937, page 45.
Table 1: Inequality of Effective Tax Rate between Social Classes
Province and District Commoner’s Effective Tax Rate/Gentry’s Effective Tax rate
Shui-an County (Zhejiang Province) 1.56- 1.65
Chenghou County (Fujian Province) 1.3-1.86
Anchi County (Fujian Province) 1.31
Longchi County(Fujian Province) 1.20
Shanghang County(Fujian Province) 1.20
Kushi County(Honan Province) 1.18-1.69
Kaiyuan Country (Fengtian Province) 1.63
Tianling County (Fengtian Province) 1.75
Source: The figures are calculated from Table 2.2. in page 40 of Wang Yejian’s Land
Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911.
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Table 2: Inequality of Land Tax Rate between Urban and Rural Areas in Fujian Province
District Rural Tax Rate/Urban Tax Rate
Yongfu County 1.01
Nanping County 1.07
Shunzhang County 1.37
Zhangding County 1.03
Yongan County 1.01
Guihua County 1.05
Source: The index was calculated from Table 2.3, Wang, 1973, p. 41
Table 3: Transaction of Manorial Land of Confucius’s Lineage in the Qianlong period
Year Manor Type of Manor Size of land(mu) Fees (tales)
1743 Meihua Private 50 5,000
1767 Meihua Private 50 -
1770 Yangjialou Private 908 -
1787 Yangjialou Private 15.6 112.32
1788 Yangjialou Private 196.73 1120.73
1789 Yangjialou Private 90 612
1792 Yangjialou Private 1275.57 2178.94
Source: Lai Huimin, Imperial Power and Nobilities in the Qing Dynasty, p. 148.
Table 4: Land Donated to Confucius’s Lineage in the Jiaqing Period
Year Identity of Donor Size of Land (mu) Type of Land
1810 Commoner - Riverbank Land
1811 Commoner 300 Waste Land
1812 Lower-ranked Gentry 500 Riverbank Land
1812 Lower-ranked Gentry 700 Waste Land
1812 Lower-raned Gentry 600 Sandy Land
1812 Lower-ranked Gentry 500 Sandy Land
1812 Lower-ranked Gentry - Sandy Land
1817 Lower-ranked Gentry - Unregistered Meadow
Source: Selected Historical Archives of Kong Fu, Qufu, vol, 6.
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Table 5: Sample Size
Manor Observations
1759-1788 Junchengchang, Qiwang, Da 207
1789-1818 Qiwang, Da, Xiaoqiwang 277
1819-1848 Nanchi, Shijing, Quantou 121
1849-1878 Nanchi, Zhangyang 158
1879-1901 Anji, Chunting,Qiwang, Hetao, Da, Nanchi,Zhangyang 475
Total N = 1,238
Table 6: Cropping System Statistics
Millet Sorghum Paddy Wheat Soybean Wheat-Soybean
Size (acre) 0.66 1.00 0.076 1.54 2.34 0.85
s.d. (0.68) (0.79) (0.090) (1.43) (0.19) (0.95)
Number of plots under sole ownership 90 127 0 147 20 102
Number of plots under dual ownership 199 45 182 45 0 245
Number of Observations 289 172 182 287 21 148
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation
Dual Ownership =1 if land operated under dual ownership 0.578 0.014
Double Cropping =1 if land was double cropped 0.280 0.449
Tax Reduction =1 if under the reign of Qianlong .379 0.014
Size Size of a holding (in mu) 2.250 0.077
Kin Tenant =1 if kin tenant 0.117 0.321
Natural Diaster =1 if there was a natural disaster in that year 0.402 0.491
Wheat Price Wheat price in tale/cang shi 206.87 61.239
Tax Reduction =1 if under the reign of Qianlong .379 0.014
N = 1,238
The minimum and maximum values for all variables except plot size and wheat price are
zero and one, respectively. The minimum value of plot size is 0.011, and the maximum
value is 24.948. The minimum value of wheat price is 127.25, and the maximum value is
579.17.
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Table 8: The Probability of Dual Ownership on a Plot
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Double Cropping 0.385 0.642
(0.097)*** (0.132)***
Tax Reduction -3.083 - 2.958
(0.130)*** (0.168)***
Size -0.674
(0.063)***
Size2 0.030
(0.003)***
Kong -0.051
(0.214)
Natural Disaster 0.333
(0.208)
Manor Dummy Y Y
County Dummy Y Y
Constant Y Y
Number of obs 1,238 1,217
***significantly different from zero at 1 percent level;** significant at 5 percent level; *sig-
nificantly different from zero at 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the tenant level.
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Table 9: The Probability of Dual Ownership on a Plot: Bivariate Probit
single probit bivariate probit
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Was a plot operated under dual ownership or sole ownership?
Double Cropping 0.385 0.642 1.810 1.804
(0.097)*** (0.132)*** (0.208)*** (0.216)***
Tax Reduction -3.083 - 2.958 -2.339 -2.374
(0.130)*** (0.168)*** (0.181)*** (0.260)***
Size -0.674 -0.534
(0.063)*** (0.071)***
Size2 0.030 0.024
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
Kong -0.051 1.177
(0.214) (0.194)
Natural Disaster 0.333 0.214
(0.208) (0.293)
Determinants of Double Cropping
Wheat Price 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.0007)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0006)***
Size 0.075 0.080
(0.032) ** (0.031)**
Size2 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.002)
Kong -0.056 -0.065
(0.147) (0.144)
Natural Disaster -0.036 -0.042
(0.059) (0.061)
Manor Dummy Y Y Y Y
County Dummy Y Y Y Y
Constant
Disturbance Correlation
ρ -0.892 -0.804
(0.070) (0.130)
Number of obs. 1225 1204 1225 1204
LR test for ρ = 0 χ2(1) = 17.901, p = 0.0000 χ2(1) = 9.123, p = 0.0025
*** significantly different from zero at 1 percent level;** significantly different from zero
at 5 percent level; *significantly different from zero at 10 percent level. Robust standard
errors are clustered at tenant level.
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Table 10: Robustness Check
Independent Variable Full Sample Full Sample Excluding Paddy Excluding Paddy
Double Cropping 0.385 0.642 0.819 0.963
(0.097)*** (0.132)*** (0.131)*** (0.160)***
Tax Reduction -3.083 - 2.958 -3.627 -3.467
(0.130)*** (0.168)*** (0.228)*** (0.326)***
Size -0.674 -0.525
(0.063)*** (0.671)***
Size2 0.030 0.025
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
Kong -0.051 -0.336
(0.214) (0.229)
Natural Disaster 0.333 0.504
(0.208) (0.096)***
Manor Dummy Y Y Y Y
County Dummy Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y
Number of obs 1,238 1,217 1,056 1,035
***significantly different from zero at 1 percent level;** significant at 5 percent level; *sig-
nificantly different from zero at 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are clustered at
tenant level.
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